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Fain: Fain: Use of Power of Eminent

THE USE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN BY
MISSOURI ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
CHARLES

J.

FAIN*

The use of the consumer cooperative as a device for bringing electricity
to the farms of America originated in the executive orderi of the late President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in that troublous economic period of the
thirties. The expressed purpose of the order was:
"To promote the generation, transmission, and distribution of
electricity in rural areas." 2
At that time, of the 6,000,000 farms in the United States only 800,000
had electric facilities, and many of this number were supplied from private
plants on the farms rather than by central station service. By 1948 over
3,500,000 farms in the United States had been electrified with central station service, largely through the cooperative device. 3
The executive order was followed by Congressional action in the form
of the Rural Electrification Act.4 Briefly, the Act provides a Rural Electrification Authority to administer a lending program to individuals, municipalities, corporations, and cooperatives, the loans to be available only for the
furnishing of electricity to those consumers in rural areas, who at the
present time are not furnished central station service. Congress appropriated the necessary funds and has continued to make funds available for
such loans up to the present time. The cooperative device was encouraged
by the Administrator as the method of distribution and since that time
the electric consumer cooperative has become the principal recipient of
the Federal loans.
The Federal act was soon followed by state enabling acts for electric
cooperatives. The Missouri General Assembly passed the Missouri Rural
Electric Cooperative Act in 1939.1 The Act provided for the organization
of a cooperative for the purpose of distributing and selling electric energy in
*Attorney, Branson, and member, Missouri Legislature; LL.B., University of
Missouri, 1951.
1. Executive Order 7037, May 11, 193.
2. Ibid.
3. Cooke, The Early Days of the R-tral Electrification Idea: 1914-1936, 42
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 431, 444 (1948).
4. Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1947).
5.

Mo. REv.

STAT.

§§ 5386-5417 (1939); now Mo. REv.

STAT.

§§ 394.010-

.310 (1949).
(159)
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rural
to its members, to governmental agencies and political subdivisions, and to other persons not in excess of ten per cent of the number of
its members. 7
areas6

Thus any cooperative established under the Missouri act could not
serve the public at large but only those persons who came within the Act.
This was necessary in order to conform to the federal act which restricted
its loans to aiding only those persons in rural areas who did not have
central station electric service.
The R.E.A. cooperative organized under the Missouri act differs in
many respects from the ordinary electric utility. The latter must, by state
law, serve the general public whereas the cooperative is expressly forbidden
to do so, and for all practical purposes it can serve only its members. It is
the purpose of this study to examine the power of the cooperative to use
the power of eminent domain in the light of the restrictive nature of the
cooperative's services in Missouri.
Can an R.E.A. cooperative organized under Missouri Statutes exercise
the power of eminent domain? The answer to this question cannot be found
in precedent in Missouri for to the present time no eminent domain proceedings, to which an R.E.A. cooperative was a party, have been taken to our
appellate courts. But with the expansion of R.E.A. facilities in Missouri
the question is being asked increasingly by Missouri attorneys. If the answer
is found in the negative the Missouri R.E.A. cooperative will be placed at
a serious disadvantage in expanding its present facilities, as the cooperative
would have to go into the market place, figuratively speaking, and bargain
for the land needed for its facilities and would, in many instances, find that
the land was unobtainable.
The Rural Electric Cooperative Act 8 provides that:
"A cooperative shall have power to exercise the power of eminent
domain in the manner provided by the laws of this state for the
exercise of that power by corporations constructing or operating
electric transmission and distribution lines or systems."
6. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 394.020 (1949). "Definitions: (a) 'Rural area' shall be
deemed to mean any area of the United States not included within the boundaries
of any city, town, or village having a population in excess of fifteen hundred inhabitants, and such term shall be deemed to include both the farm and non-farm population thereof."
7. Id. § 394.080.
8. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 394.010-.310 (1949).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol17/iss2/3
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In short, the law of eminent domain is to be applied to such a cooperative
as it is to all other kindred corporations.
The Missouri Constitution of 1945 puts a restriction upon the use
of eminent domain by corporations or cooperatives which have been given
that power by the Missouri General Assembly. It provides in Article I, section 28:
"That private property shall not be taken for private use with or
without compensation;

. .

and that when an attempt is made to

take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question
whether the contemplated use be public shall be judicially determined without regard to any legislative declaration that the use is
public."
Thus, at the present time the principles of law governing the use of eminent
domain in Missouri may be summarized as follows:
(1) The legislature in its discretion may invest a corporation or cooperative with the power of eminent domain and it is entirely within the
discretion of the legislature as to who shall exercise that power.9 But the
legislature cannot determine whether the property is being taken for a
private use or a public use-and it must be the latter else it violates the
constitutional prohibition.
(2) The determination of the question whether it be a taking for a
public or private use is given entirely to the courts.1 0
(3) True, the legislature may declare that a certain exercise of the
power of eminent domain is for a public use. Evidence of such are the
legislative declarations as to enlargement of certain cemeteries,"- the construction of drainage ditches, 2 the establishment of public parks,"1 the
erection and maintenance of bridges.' 4 And when the legislature has acted
upon facts which point to the land being taken for a public use the courts
will take cognizance of this declaration by the legislature, but, nevertheless,
9. County Court of St. Louis County v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175 (1874). "The
Legislature is the proper body to determine the necessity of the exercise of the
power and the extent to which the exercise of it shall be carried, and there is no
restraint upon the power, save that requiring that compensation shall be made."
10. Savannah v. Hancock, 91 Mo. 54, 3 S.W. 215 (1886). "It will thus be
seen that the question whether the use for which the property is about to be taken
is a public use has already been regarded in this state as a judicial question-a
question which the courts would for themselves decide."
11. Mo. REv. STAT. § 214.080 (1949).
12. Id. § 241.270.
13. Mo. Laws 1874, p. 371.
14. Mo. Rv. STAT. §§ 5381, 5382 (1939).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1952
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will not be bound by such a pronouncement. 3 For it is the courts which
must ultimately pass upon the question of "public use." When the legislature has authorized the taking of private property for what it deems a public
use, the courts have jurisdiction to investigate that question; to inquire
into the facts, and unless the court finds the purpose for which the property
is proposed to be taken is in fact a public use, the property will not be taken,
even though directed by the legislature.
The probable basis for the above principles is that the power of eminent domain stems from the inherent power of the sovereign state and that
state, acting through its legislature, can delegate the power to those whom
it sees fit. Yet, because of the fear of people that their legislatures will
exploit them, they have imposed the constitutional restrictions set out
above as a buffer against indiscriminate use of power by their legislature. 10
From the foregoing principles it becomes apparent that the determining
factor is the construction which the courts will put upon the words "public
use." As R.E.A. cooperative service is restricted to its membership 7 and its
membership is restricted by the Missouri Rural Electric Cooperative Act, 18
it cannot be said that an R.E.A. cooperative serves the public at large in
the sense that any member of the public desiring electric service could get
it from the cooperative lines even though those lines might traverse that
would-be consumer's land. In this respect the cooperative differs radically
from the usual private utility which, in principle at least, maintains it will
serve the public at large, i.e., any person within reach of its facilities may
obtain service without restriction.
Generally speaking, there have been two interpretations of the constitutional restriction embodied in the phrase "for public use." What may
15. Savannah v. Hancock, 91 Mo. 4,56, 3 S.W. 215 (1886). "Notwithstandin [it being a judicial question] this, it is undeniably true, that the courts were
disposed somewhat to a legislative declaration on the subject Hence, it is said, if

the Legislature has declared the use, or purpose, to be a public one, its judgment
will be respected by the courts, unless the use be palpably private."
16. Southern Illinois and Missouri Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1, 73 S.W.
453, 456 (1903). "The right of eminent domain appertains to every independent
government. It requires no constitutional recognition. It is an attribute of sovereignty. The provision found in our Constitution providing for just compensation
for private property taken or damaged for public use is- a limitation only on the
exercise of that right"

17. Su~pra. p. 159.
18. Supra, p. 160.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol17/iss2/3
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be called the orthodox conservative meaning of the phrase is a right to use
by the public in general.19 Lewis 20 states:

"The public use of anything is the employment or application of
the thing by the public. Public use means the same as use by the
public, and this, it seems, is the construction the words should receive in the constitutional provision in question."
A more liberal interpretation of the meaning "for public use" is that
it means the same as "public advantage"; the same as "public benefit."
Nichols 21 generalizes the more liberal interpretation of the term thus:
"Anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote the productive powers of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a section of the state, or which
leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new resources for
the employment of capital and labor, manifestly contributes to the
general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, and
•,. constitutes a public use."
It is difficult to understand why various courts have arrived at entirely
different constructions of the term "for public use" unless one is familiar with
the historical development of the law of eminent domain in our state
courts. 2 2 A brief look at that development may suffice to clarify the picture.

In the first half of the nineteenth century land was plentiful; there
were the ever beckoning vast regions to the west where land was to be had
for the asking. A general feeling of development, largely agricultural and
trading, was in the air. Consequently, the restriction or "just compensation" was an adequate protection to the landowner that he would not be
exploited; for the normal landowner was usually willing to give up his land
for an adequate price.
Then too, the industrial development had not yet arrived so that the
power of eminent domain was not delegated to large and powerful companies but was rather thought of as to be used by the state itself in such
19. Note, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. Ray. 285, 287-288 (1946); MILLS, EMINENT DO(1879). In 11 CooLE'YS CONs rruTioNAL LIMITATIONS 1129 (8th ed.
1927), the author points out that public use implies a possession, occupation, and
enjoyment by the public at large, or by public agencies. For other definitions of
"public use," see NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 39 (2d ed. 1917); 20 C.J. .$52.
20. LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN § 258 (3d ed. 1909).
MAIN 15

21.
22.

(2d ed. 1917).
For a discussion of the development of the federal law of eminent domain

NIcHOLs, THE LAW oF EMINENT DOMAIN 130, 131

as related to the restriction "for public use," see Comment, Pablic Use Limitation
on Eminent Domain, 58 YALE L. J. 599, 608-614 (1949); also Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. REv. 615 (1940).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1952
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23

Many of the early state constitutions had no
developments as post roads.
24
such restriction as to "public use" for in those times such was not needed.
In this early period the power of eminent domain was used by private
individuals for the establishment of mills on streams necessitating flowage
easements. These were certainly not for the use of the public generally, yet
they were not questioned because it was obvious that their establishment
was for the advancement of the country as a whole, for the benefit of the
public, so to speak. The public benefit resulting from these developments of
2
the water power was thus regarded as sufficient to establish public use. 1
But as land became scarce and the industrial development of the
nation began in earnest there was a gradual change of the judicial view of
eminent domain and that change became more apparent toward the end
of the century. To accelerate their industrial development many states delegated eminent domain to favored enterprises, especially railroads. The
courts sought ways of limiting the power of eminent domain in order to
protect private property from this new threat of powerful financial interests. 26 This was also reflected in the wave of constitutional prohibitions
23. See historical discussions in 1 NicHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 41, 83, 84,
85 (2d ed. 1917); 1 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN § 275 (2d ed. 1909).
24. The first constitutions of most of the original states lacked any provisions
pertaining to eminent domain. Massachusetts and Vermont were alone in requiring
compensation. Pennsylvania was alone in requiring the consent of the landowner
or that of his legal representative. In 1868, five of the original states were still
without the guarantee of "just compensation." Most of the states later admitted to
the Union provided for compensation in their constitutions. Grant, The "Higher
Law" Background of the law of Emaineot Domain, 6 Wis. L. Ray. 67, 70 (1931).
25. Aldridge v. Tuscumbia C. & D. R.R., 2 Stew. & P. 199 (Ala. 1832); Omstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (1866); Boston & Roxbury Mill Dam Corp. v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467 (Mass. 1832); Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 444
(1867); Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (1832); Beekman
v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 73 (N.Y. 1831); Harvey v. Thomas,
10 Watts 63, 66 (Pa. 1840).
26. Railroad Co. v. Iron Works, 31 W. Va. 710, 735, 8 S.E. 453, 467 (1888):
"It seems to us, if railroad corporations were permitted ad libitum to do what this
defendant in error asks to be done, 'no deadlier blow could be dealt the private
rights of the citizens.' If the doctrine claimed by defendant in error should prevail,
then corporations might go to any private place they chose, to rolling-mills, icehouses, tanneries, sugar-refineries, brickyards, grocery-stores, etc., and in the country
to stone-quarries, coal-mines, stock-farms, etc., and if any private citizen dared to
stand in the way, violently wrest his property from him for their mere private gain.
In such a state of affairs the so-called protection by the constitution of the rights
of private property would by the arbitrary ruling of the courts be rendered nugatory
and void. The mere declaration in a petition, that the property is to be appropriated to public use does not make it so; and evidence, that the public will have a
right to use it, amounts to nothing in the face of the fact that the only incentive
to ask for the condemnation was a private gain, and it was apparent, that the general public had no interest in it.
"We would do nothing to hinder the development of the State nor to cripple
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol17/iss2/3
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ushered into the state constitutions during this period. For example, in
Missouri there was no constitutional prohibition concerning "public use" until
the Constitution of 1875. Case law was relied on entirely to prevent a
taking for a private use. But in the Constitution of 1875 there was the
new provision:
"That, whenever an attempt is made to take private property
for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and as such,
judicially determined, without regard to any legislative assertion
that the use is public."
This is the same provision which is found in the Missouri Constitution of
1945. The answer to this need for protection as found by the courts, was
the so-called "use by the public" test, expanded in some circumstances to
mean "the right to use by the public generally."
The test left much to be desired, however. If carried to its logical
conclusion then eminent domain could be used to acquire property for the
erection of hotels and theaters for it was traditional that the public, generally, had the right to use those facilities. Thus it had to be acknowledged
that use and occupation by the general public had its limitations. In such
cases the benefit to the public theory, prevalent in the earlier period, was
2
still used. 7
Then too, there were the "Mill Acts" of the earlier days of the century
railroad companies in assisting such development, but at the same time we must
protect the property-rights of the citizens. Whatever corporations may be entitled
to under a proper construction of the law they will receive; but they must not be
permitted to take private property for private use."
See, also, the concurring opinion of Senator Tracy, one of the earliest advocates
of this restriction of eminent domain, in Bloodgood v. Mohawk and H. R.R., 18
Wend. 9, 60 (N. Y. 1837): "When the 'public interest' is the only limitation on the
power of eminent domain, is there any limitation which can be set to the exertion
6f the legislative will in the appropriation of private property? It seems to me that
such a construction of legislative powers is inconsistent with secure possession and
enjoyment of private property."
27. See Dayton G. & S. Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 410-411 (1876).
The court in adopting the public utility, benefit and advantage construction of public use pointed out that "if public occupation and enjoyment of the object for which
the land is to be condemned furnished the only and true test for the right of eminent domain, then the Legislature would certainly have the constitutional authority
to condemn the lands of any private citizen for the purpose of building hotels and
theatres ... ," and that "it is certain that this view, if literally carried out to the
utmost extent, would lead to very absurd results, if it did not entirely destroy the
security of the private right of individuals." It is to be noted that this is mere
dictum so far as the hotels and theaters are concerned, however, as the land to be
taken in this instance was for mining purposes, the principal industry of Nevada at
the time and a development which innured to the benefit of the public as a whole.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1952
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which had clearly authorized the taking of private property without a use
by the public. To fit these "public benefit" instances into the legal straightjacket of "use by the public," "possession and occupancy of the public," "a
right to use by the general public," called for legal sleight-of-hand tactics.
Chief Justice Shaw, of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, tackled the
task notwithstanding the fact that he had held at an earlier day 28 that
taking land under the mill acts was for a public use. Thus in Murdock v.
Stickney 29 he ruled that the taking in the mill acts cases was not a taking
of property under the law of eminent domain but rather the exercise of the
police power to enforce the recalcitrant landowner to share his land by giving
the mill owner a flowage easement. He said:
"The principle on which this law is founded is not, as has sometimes been supposed, the right of eminent domain, the sovereign
right of taking private property for public use. It is not in any
proper sense a taking of the property of an owner of the land
flowed."
Chief Justice Shaw was thus able to meet the needs of the industrial
expansion of the Massachusetts Commonwealth by allowing the flowage
easements for the development of water power and at the same time hold
to the "use by the public" test for property generally. His evasion was
quickly pounced on by sister states caught in the same quandary of industrial
expansion and a preservation of private property. The case of Head v.
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.30 went from New Hampshire to the United
States Supreme Court using Shaw's argument. Under the New Hampshire
mill act the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company desired to overflow Head's
land in order to establish the proper water supply to run the company's
mills for general manufacturing purposes. Justice Grey, commenting on the
extent of the mill acts in the various states, observing that they were found
in practically every state in the union, and also observing the need for
industrial development made possible by water power, proceeded to dispose
of Head's argument that this was a taking not for a public use by quoting
extensively the arguments of Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts: "
28. See Chase v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152, 169 (Mass. 1849), where
Chief Justice Shaw said: "But these acts (the mill acts) justifying the flowing of
another's land without his consent can rest only on the right of eminent domain to
take private property for public use on making a compensation."
29. 8 Cush. 113, 116 (Mass. 1851).
30. 113 U. S. 9 (1884).
31. 113 U. S. 9, 21 (1884).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol17/iss2/3
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"When property, in which several persons have a common interest,

cannot be fully and beneficially enjoyed in its existing condition,
the law often provides a way in which they may compel one another
to submit to measures necessary to secure its beneficial enjoyment,
making equitable compensation to any whose control of or interest
in the property is thereby modified.-. . . water rights held in common, incapable of partition at law, may be the subject of partition
in equity, . . .by a sale of the right and a division of the proceeds."
It is of interest to note that Justice Grey at the very same October
term held in Cole v. City of Grange,32 that the city of La Grange, Missouri,
could not issue bonds to aid in the establishment of a general manufacturing
business in La Grange. The citizens had attempted to purchase certain
land and give asistance to a company to start manufacturing in their midst
because of the general benefit anticipated by the community. The attempted
bond issue was to cover these expenditures. Grey remarked that this would
be taking of private property (by the taxing power) for a private use as the
general benefit derived by the city of La Grange from such an establishment
is not a public use within the meaning of that term. He distinguished Burlington v. Beasley,33 a case arising in Kansas, where such bonds were upheld by
saying:
"The grist mill (to be established by the use of the bonds) is held
to be a work of internal improvement, to aid in constructing which
a town might issue bonds under the statutes of Kansas, as it was
a public mill which ground for toll for all customers."
This was another explanation given by the courts for allowing eminent
domain under the mill acts-that these grist mills had to grind for the public.
Burlington v. Beasley was decided'on that basis. This was sufficient to bring
them within the "use by the public" test. Such reasoning was justified where
the mill statute was confined to a taking under eminent domain only for
grist mills which by statute or custom had to serve the general public, one
and all, but it could not justify those instances of condemnation under a mill
statute where the purpose was not to establish a grist mill but rather for
manufacturing purposes in general.
The Missouri Mill Acts restricted eminent domain to those mills which
ground for the general public. The statutes also regulated the amount of
grain which the mill was to take as its share for the grinding. The statutes
32. 113 U. S. 1 (1884).
33. 94 U. S. 310 (1876).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1952
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were so regulatory in nature as to even require the mill owner to help unload
the grain.8- Thus, Missouri was consistent in its doctrine of use by the public
as far as the mill act cases were concerned. The general public did have a
right to the use of the mill; it was a type of necessary public service as most
of the people raised their own grain and took it to these public mills to be
ground into flour, corn meal, and feed. These mills were, in a sense, Missouri's first public utilities. The Revised Laws of 1825, Volume 2, page 591,
provided:
"All mills now in operation or which may hereafter be put in operation, within this state, for grinding wheat, rye, corn, or other grain
and which shall grind for toll shall be deemed public mills."
The Revised Statutes of 1889, Section 7024 defined public mills as:
"All grist mills which grind for toll, and all water grist mills." "
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the "use by the public" doctrine had become firmly established in Missouri's law of eminent domain;
indeed, as the Mill acts cases in Missouri affirm, it had been consistently
followed whereas in other jurisdictions it had been used only when so desired.
Nowhere did it find stronger support than in the Missouri cases dealing with
condemnation of land by political subdivisions of the state. In 1874 the Supreme Court of Missouri applied the "for the use of the public" test in sustaining the taking of land for the establishment of Forest Park in Saint
Louis County. A legislative act authorized the taking of property by Saint
Louis County for this park. Griswold, the owner of the land, contended that
this was not a taking for a public use because there would be more benefit to
the people of the city of Saint Louis than the people of the County of Saint
Louis. The court replied: 86
"Private property is taken for public use when it is appropriated for
the common use of the public at large. A stronger instance cannot
be given than that of property converted into a public park. A
public park becomes the property of the public at large, and is
under the control of the public authorities; it may well be paid for
by the public, as it is intended for public use."

34. Mo. STAT. Ch. 98 (Wagner, 1872).

35. Mo. Mill Acts: Dec. 3, 1822, 1 Terr. Laws 948; 2 Rzv. STAT. 587 (1825);
STAT. 405 (1835); REv. STAT., Ch. 121 (1845); REV. STAT. ch. 112 (1855);
Gm. STAT.cl. 101 (1865); Mo. STAT., ch. 98 (Wagner, 1872); REV. STAT., ch. 132
(1879).
36. County Court of St. Louis County v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175 (1874).
REV.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol17/iss2/3
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The court thus held that "public use" did not mean equal use by the public
but a right for the public in general to use the facility if the members of that
public so desired. This explanation was sufficient to uphold all takings for
common carriers and public improvements of diverse nature.
The Forest Park case was accepted as the expression of the law on the
subject up to that time and was consistently followed in such cases as the
taking of land for an alley; 87 for a street;s 8 for a sewer line; s9 and for railroads, their right-of-ways, yards and workshops. 40 These takings were explained as a use for the general public and in the railroad cases it was said
the railroads must carry the freight for the public, and the public generally
could ride on their trains, thus the public had a right to the use of the land.
But the "use by the public" test did not meet with the same success
in many states as it had in Missouri. Especially was this true of the western
states where irrigation and mining were highly important to the economic
well-being of the state. The Nevada Constitution 41 provided that no person
shall be:
"Deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation having been first made or secured."
The Dayton Mining Company desired a strip of land so that it could "transport the wood, lumber, timbers and other materials to enable it to conduct
and carry on its business of mining." Condemnation proceedings were held up
on the grounds that this taking was not for a public use within the meaning
of the Nevada Constitution. The Nevada Supreme Court in Dayton Miing
Co. v. Seawell 42 replied:
"This brings us to the direct question: What is the meaning of the
words 'public use' as contained in the provision of our state constitution? It is contended by respondent that these words should be
construed with the utmost rigor against those who try to seize property, and in favor of those whose property is to be seized ... that
the words mean possession, occupation, or direct enjoyment by the
public. On the other hand, it is claimed by petitioner that courts
should give to the words a broader and more extended meaning,
viz., that of utility, advantage or benefit; that any appropriation of
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Savannah v. Hancock, 91 Mo. 54, 3 S.W. 215 (1887).
City of Caruthersville v. Ferguson, 226 S.W. 912 (Mo. 1920).
Hart v. Bothe, 247 S.W. 256 (Mo. 1923).
Chicago, B. &Q. R.R. v. McCooey, 273 Mo. 29, 200 S.W. 59 (1917).
NEv. CoNsT. Art. I, Sec. 29 (1864).
11 Nev. 394, 400, 401 (1876).
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private property under the right of eminent domain for any purpose
of great public benefit, interest or advantage to the community is a
taking for a public use....
"It has frequently been decided that the public have an interest in
the use of a railroad because it increases the facility for travel from
one part of the country to another, and every citizen may use it by
paying the usual rates of fare; a turnpike is said to be for a public
use because every man can.., travel upon it for a fixed compensation (regulated by the Legislature). The same principle has been
applied to many of the other enumerated cases. It is, however, evident that the act in question cannot be sustained upon any such
reasoning. It can only be sustained, if at all, by adopting the theory
advanced by petitioner's counsel. The issue is clearly presented and
it ought to be fairly met.... That mining is of paramount interest
of the state is not questioned; that anything which tends directly to
encourage mineral developments and increase the mineral resources
of the state is for the benefit of the public and is calculated to advance the general welfare and prosperity of the people of this state,
is a self-evident proposition."
This idea of public advantage adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court
was followed in such western states as Utah" in the development of mining
and irrigation and Idaho" in the development of that state's lumber industry. But Missouri failed to recognize the need for such a liberal interpretation as used by her sister states to the west.
Thus the matter stood until the case of Kansas City v. Liebl4 , came
before the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1923. The residents along Gladstone boulevard in Kansas City petitioned Kansas City to pass an ordinance
which would, in effect, zone the street for residential purposes by restricting
the industrial use to gasoline stations of less than 100 gallons capacity. It
would also forbid the use of billboards along the street. The city also was
to condemn the land for a distance of thirty-five feet on each side of the
street, thus establishing a building line set back from the street. This land
was to be paid for by assessments upon those residents within one hundred
and fifty feet of either side of the boulevard. This would benefit those
property owners within the district thus established by keeping the property
43. Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 Pac. 371 (1904), affirmed 198 U. S. 361

(1905); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Company, 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac. 296
(1904), affirmed 200 U. S. 527 (1906).

44. Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 Pac. 426 (1906).
45. 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404 (1923).
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free from unsightly businesses and because of the parkway established by
the thirty-five foot space on either side would tend to increase the realty
values of their holdings.48
In the subsequent condemnation proceedings it was argued that the
power of eminent domain could not be exercised as it would be a taking of
private property for the benefit of those property owners within the proposed
district; that this was not a "public use" according to the Missouri cases as
the number to be benefited was restricted to those within the district and
47
not available to the public in general.
Judge White wrote the majority opinion in which he adopted the view
of public use being synonymous with public benefit, public advantage. He
quoted Nichol's interpretation, supra, as to the meaning of public advantage.4 8 Judge White continued:
"As might be expected, the more limited application of the principle appears in the earlier cases, and the more liberal application
has been rendered necessary by complex conditions due to recent
developments of civilization and the increasing density of population."
The majority opinion, in effect, said that in order to constitute a public use
it is no longer necessary that the entire community should actually use the
land. Neither is the public use lessened by the fact that the benefit inures
largely to a group of individuals. The dissent, expressed by Judge Walker
and concurred in by Judge Blair, argued that this was an extension of
46. In many respects the case closely resembled the later zoning cases whereby
land is taken by the police power rather than eminent domain. But, it is to be
remembered, at the time the aesthetic value to the general public driving upon the
boulevard was not recognized as a proper exercise of the police power. Thus the
zoning features of the Liebi case are omitted from the discussion but it is suggested
that they are related to the decision arrived at by the supreme court. It is of
interest to note, in this respect, that zoning restrictions may now be imposed under
the police power of the state. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365
(1926); State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179, 289 S.W.
720 (1927).
47. Kansas City v. Hyde, 196 Mo. 498, 96 S.W. 201 (1906): "A use is not a
public one if an individual or a number of individuals is given the right to use the
property in such a manner as to exclude the general public."
48. Judge White: "No satisfactory definition of the term 'public use' has ever
been achieved by the courts. Two different theories are presented by the judicial
attempts to describe the subjects to which the expression would apply. One theory
of 'public use' limits the application to 'employment,' 'occupation.' A more liberal
and more flexible meaning makes it synonymous with 'public advantage,' 'public
benefit'." 298 Mo. 569, 592, 252 S.W. 404, 407 (1923).
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public use beyond the concept of the previous cases and adopted the narrow
view found in the previous Missouri cases.- 9
The most recent controversy over the meaning of public use has
arisen in the field of public housing. The narrow doctrine of use by the
public or a right to use by the public was first used to strike down state
governmental attempts at supplying low-cost housing to selected, restrictive
groups. This early view was evidenced in Massachusetts in 1912 in Opinion
of Justices" where the housing project was restricted to only certain members
of the public, i.e., those within a certain artisan class. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court ruled:
"The dominating design of a statute requiring the use of public
funds must be the promotion of public interests and not the furtherance of the advantage of individuals ...

the incidental advantage

to the public, or to the State, which results from the promotion of
private interests, and the prosperity of private enterprises, or business, does not justify their aid by the use of public money raised by
taxation, or for which taxation may become necessary. .

.

.This

would mean that the home of one wage-earner might be taken by
the power of the Commonwealth for the purpose of handing it
over to another wage-earner."
The court, in overcoming the argument that public funds were spent
for schools and hospitals which were not used by all the public, went on
to state that the main difference btween a government condemning land
to use in the business of supplying its people with such facilities-schools,
hospitals, transportation-and condemnation for the purpose of supplying
a low-income group of the people with living quarters, is that in the former
the people can use the facility as of right, while in the latter only those
whose income is below a specified amount can qualify for the privilege of
using this governmental enterprise.
Thus, when the federal government first attempted public housing
under Title II of the National Industrial Recovery Act', this "use by the
public" doctrine was used against it in a case holding that condemnation
49. Judge Walker: "Public, as the term is used in the Constitution, means
everybody; if the use is not for everybody, it is a private use. If to an individual
or any number of individuals the right is given to use property in such a manner as
will practically exclude the general public therefrom, it is the giving of the property
to a private use and a destruction of its public service character." Id. at 611, 252
S.W. at 414.
50. 211 Mass. 624, 625, 98 N.E. 611, 612 (1921).
51. 48 STAT. 200, 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-411 (1940)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol17/iss2/3
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could not be had as the intended use was private. 52 This case was appealed
by the government from the federal district court to the circuit court of
appeals where the trial court's decision was affirmed, but the appellate court
relied upon the limitation of federal power rather than the trial court's
53
interpretation of the public use doctrine.
Meanwhile, Congress had enacted the United States Housing Act in
1937's which granted the necessary funds to the various states to carry
out their own housing programs, thus putting the issue up to the states
as to whether there could be condemnation. Of course, a requisite to obtain
the Federal funds was that the state acts restrict the tenants of such public
housing projects to those in certain of the low income groups as specified
in the federal act. In this respect the legislation was very similar to the
grant of loans under the Federal Rural Electrification Act as in the latter
funds could not be borrowed unless a restrictive group, i.e., those without
central station service, in a rural area, was to be supplied with the electricity
made available by the loans.5"
It was inevitable that the argument of "use by the public" would be
used in the state courts to prevent the condemnation of the land necessary
for the public housing projects-the same argument which had been effectively used in Massachusetts in 1912 in the Opinion of the Justices case.
Public housing was opposed by influential groups in most communities and
the narrow doctrine seemed a convenient legal weapon to use in the state
courts to block the program. But the state courts refused to accept the
argument as it was applied to housing, the leading decision being New York
City Housing Authority v. Muller,56 decided in 1936, one year before the

Federal Housing Authority was established. The New York Court of Appeals said:
"The fundamental purpose of government is to protect the health,
safety and general welfare of the public ...its power plant for the
purpose consists of the power of taxation, the police power, and the
power of eminent domain .

.

. it seems to be constitutionally im-

52. United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ky.

1935).

53. United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F. 2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935),
certiorarigranted, 268 U. S. 567 (1935), dismissed on motion of Government, 297

U. S. 726 (1936)

54. 50 STAT. 888 (1937), 42 U. S. C. §§ 1401-1430 (1940).
55. Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1945).
56. 270 N. Y. 333, 1 N.E. 2d 153 (1936).
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material whether one or another of the sovereign powers is employed. . . .Use of a proposed structure, facility, or service by everybody and anybody is one of the abandoned universal tests of a
public use .... That is a public benefit and, therefore, at least as
this case is concerned, a public use."
In the twenty-two state courts where the question came up for decision
the public housing projects were held to be a public use; most of the courts
talking in terms of benefit to the public and general welfare. It is significant,
however, that these condemnations were sustained on the basis of the police
power as well as the power of eminent domain; thus, it is difficult to say
that they are a clearcut repudiation of the "use by the public" test when
the power of eminent domain alone is considered.
The Missouri Supreme Court considered the public housing question in
7
Laret Investment Co. v. Dickman, Mayor."
An act of the Missouri General
58
Assembly provided for the expenditure of public funds for low-income

housing and declared:
"That the clearing, replanning and reconstruction of such unsanitary, etc., areas are public uses and purposes for which public money
may be spent and private property acquired and are governmental
functions of state concern."
Taken as a whole, the statute spoke in terms of the police power
of the state and recognized the social and economic need for such housing.
The Laret Investment Co. contended that the Public Housing Agency
established by Mayor Dickmann of the City of Saint Louis, was not for
such "public purposes" as to give the agency exemption from taxation accorded municipal corporations under the Missouri Constitution.,,, The
Investment Company said that:
"In determining whether the declared purposes of the Housing
Authority are public functions we must be guided by a consideration... whether the public generallf, or only a limited group, benefitted thereby." 60
57. 134 S.W. 2d 65 (Mo. 1939).
58. Mo. Housing Act of 1939, Mo. Laws 1939, pp. 488-502, Mo. STAT. ANN.
§ 7853 et seq., now Mo. REv. STAT. § 99.010 et seq. (1949).
59. Mo. CoNsT. Art. X. §§ 6-7: "The property, real and personal, of the State,
counties and other municipal corporations... shall be exempt from taxation." "All
laws exempting property from taxation, other than the property above enumerated,
shall be void."
60. 134 S.W. 2d 65 at 68, 69. The investment company cited and relied upon
Opinion of Justices, supra n. 50, and United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville,
supra, n. 52.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol17/iss2/3
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Judge Clark, speaking for the court, replied:
"Nor can we be governed alone by the fact that only a portion of
the public will be directly benefited, or benefited in a greater degree
than the public generally."
He then distinguished the case of United States v.Certain Lands in Louisville 6l by saying:

"That case recognizes the distinction between the powers of the
Federal and State governments and does not purport to decide
what is a "public use" under a state constitution.62

Judge Clark commented on the Opinion of Justices case 63 by saying that
the police power of Massachusetts was not involved while in the Missouri
Act the General Assembly took special cognizance of the dire necessity for
clearing the slum areas. Thus, Judge Clark implied that here the police
power of the state was involved. Such an implication is justified as far as
the abatement of the slum conditions is concerned but quare as to whether
any power but that of eminent domain is involved in the building of the
new housing units. He further cited Matter of New York Housing Author-

ity v. Mulger"4 as the proper law on the subject of public use.
CONCLUSION

From a consideration of the foregoing cases it is evident that the rural
electric cooperatives as established in Missouri would be able to exercise
the power of eminent domain as delegated to them by the Missouri General
Assembly if the courts adopted the liberal view of public use; if they held
"public use" to mean public advantage, public benefit. There is precedent
in the Liebi° case and those cases which have followed it;66 precedent sufficient to allow the courts to abandon the earlier doctrine of "use by the
public" and "right to use by the public." Then, too, all the states which
have considered the meaning of public use in reference to public housing
61. Supra, n. 53.

62. Laret Investment Co. v. Dickmann, Mayor, 134 S.W. 2d 65, 69 (Mo.
1939).
63. Supra, n. 50.
64. Supra, n. 56.
65. Supra, n. 45.

66. See e.g. City of Kirkwood v. Venable, 351 Mo. 460, 173 S.W. 2d 8, 12
(1943); City of Lebanon v. Schneider, 349 Mo. 712, 163 S.W. 2d 588, 592 (1942);
State ex rel. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S.W. 720, 724
(1927); Empire Trust Co. v. Stepp, 275 S.W. 982, 984 (Mo. 1925); State ex rel.
McDonnell v. Brown, 274 S.W. 965, 967 (Mo. 1925).
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have now come to the conclusion that "public benefit" is the controlling
factor rather than "a right to use by the public." Here is a direct analogy
to the Missouri R.E.A. cooperative as far as "public use" is concerned.
It could certainly not be argued that the electrification of Missouri's
farms has not been, and will not continue to be, of general benefit to the
people of Missouri as a whole. The rural electrification program in Missouri
has been of general benefit from the standpoint of economics: It has enabled
the Missouri farmer to produce more products and do it more efficiently,
with the consequent saving to the state as a whole; the electrification of
Missouri farms has opened up a virgin market for exploitation by manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of electrical appliances of every description; the rural electric cooperatives have added much to the economic wellbeing of the state by the consequent employment made possible by the
program.
But if the courts chose not to abandon the narrow doctrine found in
the Missouri cases previous to 1923, there is certainly ample justification
for holding that the electric cooperatives' use of the power of eminent domain is to be distinguished from those cases where the narrow doctrine
has been followed. For example, here is no use of the taxing power as was
evident in Cole v. City of La Grange. 7 The mill act cases, which, in Missouri,
held so strenuously to the narrow doctrine in the latter part of the last century, were never allowed to stand in the way of industrial development in
the New England states. They should not now, in Missouri's rural developmert, stand in the way of bringing electricity to the farms of Missouri.

67. Supra, n. 32.
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